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Archives of Editorials #8

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Food, money from overseas help Haitians survive crisis

Seeds of Hope : NCHR's commitment to removing the strangling noose of impunity in Haiti

Nation Building in Haiti: Can We Do Better This Time?

Why Haiti Should Get Out of CARICOM

Haiti: Armed groups still active

Haiti rich and poor are at war

Don't Reinstate Army

US looking at Aristide's possible role in drug trade

Food, money from overseas help Haitians survive crisis

Family in U.S., elsewhere provide much-needed aid

"I don't know what I would do without the money [they] send," Edmond said, referring to the $300 she gets monthly from family members living in Pembroke Pines, Fla. "I suppose we would lay down and starve."

Edmond, 32, is among thousands of Haitians who are weathering their nation's political and economic crisis with the help of family members overseas.

Haitian immigrants living in the United States send an estimated $800 million annually to relatives in this Caribbean nation of 8 million. About 45 percent of those remittances come from Florida, according to a study by Manuel Orozco of Georgetown University in Washington.

That money has been a lifeline to many following the violence and chaos that began in February when armed rebels in Gonaives launched an anti-government rebellion that led to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's departure.

Police and many government officials abandoned their posts as the rebels rolled through Haiti's cities, forcing many businesses to shut down and pushing an already fragile economy to the breaking point. As the rebellion gained steam, looters ransacked homes, government offices, businesses and humanitarian-aid facilities.

The majority of Haitians, who were already struggling to live on wages that averaged about $1 a day, have faced even greater challenges in meeting the most basic needs - food, clean water, shelter, health care - in recent weeks.

Remittances from the United States are helping them keep their heads above water.

"The Haitian diaspora has sent an increase in money over the past month in response to the necessity of people there," said Orozco, referring to the wide distribution of Haitian exiles in the U.S. and elsewhere.

Edmond's relatives in the United States, including her sister and brother-in-law, are among the many who reacted to the crisis by sending both money and food.

"I feel like in times of emergencies like this I must help them," said Edmond's brother-in-law Bertin Semelfort. "I know things are tough right now so I try and send some extra money and rice too."

The South Florida Sun-Sentinel is a Tribune Publishing newspaper.

Copyright © 2004, The Baltimore Sun

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Seeds of Hope : NCHR's commitment to removing the strangling noose of impunity in Haiti

By Pierre Esperance, Director of the National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR)

Haiti is in a time of critical transition as it attempts to move forward from a period of significant instability and insecurity. In this time of re-building and restructuring, it is essential that the principals of justice and law are respected and promoted. It is fundamental that past injustices are validated, that justice is sought, and that fundamental human rights are defended and protected.

Cycles of Violence

Haiti's history is marked by a cycle of violence and political upheavals, where the victims of yesterday become the persecutors of tomorrow. Haiti has recently witnessed this phenomenon.

During the coup d'état years between 1991 and 1994, thousands of Haitians supporting Aristide were subjected to various forms of brutality and violence at the hands of the coup leaders. Extra-judicial executions, rape, torture were commonplace, and bloody massacres were committed against Haitian citizens opposed to the coup - the famous Raboteau Massacre of 22 April 1994 being one such example. But the tides turned significantly in the behaviour and attitude of members of the Fanmi Lavalas party during the past three (3) years of the Aristide presidency during which individuals in opposition to the ruling Lavalas party were persecuted.

Given this cycle, NCHR is quite concerned about acts of revenge and retaliation being carried out against Lavalas supporters. Immediately following Aristide's departure, NCHR began receiving an increase in calls and visits from Lavalas supporters who found themselves victims of violence.

Perhaps one of the most horrific examples is that of five (5) young men of La Saline who were brutally executed by Haitian police officers. Known Lavalas militants, the young men, ranging in ages from seventeen (17) to twenty-four (24), were apprehended by the police on Saturday, 20 March 2004, to be found dead the next day, their bodies discarded in different areas of the capital. It has been discovered that the officers implicated in the murders had previously been working under the orders of Jean-Claude Jean Baptiste, former Police Chief and one of Aristide's right-hand men.

NCHR became involved immediately, providing various forms of assistance to the families including the facilitation of meetings with senior police officials. The five (5) Haitian police officers implicated in the murders have been suspended and are under investigation by the General Inspection of the Haitian National Police.

With a reputation of being highly politicized, unprofessional, and the largest source of human rights violations, the Haitian National Police (PNH) force has also come under attack. Haitian police officers have become targets of violence, revenge and retaliation. Among others, NCHR is currently treating a gruesome dossier involving the violent murders of two (2) police officers in the metropolitan zone. To date, NCHR has been able to assist and accompany the families of these officers in seeking justice for their lost loved ones.

NCHR's doors are open to all victims of abuse and violence related to the disrespect of basic human rights, regardless of political affiliation, socio-economic status, sex, religion, or profession. In the past, victims of human rights abuses - whatever their background or affiliation - have sought out human rights organizations and the local press to denounce what has happened to them. As victims and/or their families speak out against their violators and seek the assistance of NCHR, the organization will continue to do everything within its jurisdiction to see that justice is rendered and fundamental rights are protected, defended and promoted.

The Noose of Impunity

There exists a fine line between forgetting the past and moving on, between forgiveness and seeking justice for those who have been victimized. To be sure, reconciliation must be completely free of thoughts and acts of revenge and retaliation. Yet at the same time, reconciliation is not mutually exclusive to the principles of justice and truth.

NCHR is extremely preoccupied with the question of impunity which has been strangling this country for many years, with numerous examples from the years of the Aristide presidency. Many horrific and savage crimes were committed during the past three (3) years - crimes that must be dealt with in order for reconciliation and advancement.

One can cite the Jean Dominique murder, Brignol Lindor murder, the executions of Viola Robert's three (3) sons, and the most recent La Scierie (St. Marc) massacre of 11 February 2004. These are high profile cases to be sure ; yet for every high profile case, there are a plethora of cases, well-documented yet largely not publicized.

These crimes involved individuals from all levels of society - from high ranking government officials, to members of the Haitian judiciary, leaders of state companies, senior police officials and officers at all levels of the Haitian National Police, and members of organizations affiliated with the Lavalas party.

Mobilizing to Fight Impunity

Many wounds - emotional, psychological and physical - have not yet healed. Many victims and their families continue to grieve, unable to find closure as justice has not been rendered. Many questions have been left unanswered. And they must be answered and the hurt must be addressed. In order to build a society based on peace, there must be justice. In order for reconciliation there must be recognition of past wrongs and injustices. The truth must be exposed and subsequently dealt with in order for Haitian society to move forward.

For to forget what has happened in this country during the past three (3) years is to repeat what has happened. This is the cycle of impunity that must be broken. And it can be broken, not by forgetting and covering over, but rather by remembering and exposing, seeking and finding, judging and holding people accountable - in doing so, changing and building a future of peace and justice in Haiti.

To mobilize and reinforce its dedication to the fight against impunity, NCHR has developed an anti-impunity campaign full of diverse activities with the goal of establishing a culture of accountability and responsibility, free of impunity and corruption wherein violators of human rights are held accountable for their actions.

The year-long campaign will consist of extensive field research and documentation, publication of a comprehensive report, letter-writing campaigns, photograph exhibits, and conference-debates reinforced by press coverage, radio announcements, posters and flyers.

In addition to exposing injustices, NCHR hopes the campaign activities will, among other things, serve to increase victims' access to the judicial system and thus increase the obtainment of justice while stimulating the experience and participation of Haitian citizens in lobbying efforts and the democratic process.

Setting Judicial Precedents

Since its existence, NCHR has been striving for judicial reform on several levels, fighting to have a system that provides justice for all Haitian citizens, regardless of socio-eco-political status. In Haiti, there exists a flagrant disequilibrium in the distribution of justice. Those who have money and position are able to pay for top quality lawyers, who more than adequately represent them in a court of law. More often than not, the victims of the abuse and crimes are poor and have little to no access to a lawyer and as such, little or no access to justice. Their rights are not defended and they become victims a second time as the perpetrators go free.

Thus, with regards to the La Scierie (St. Marc) Massacre, NCHR has placed extra attention on providing assistance to these victims. This massacre, which began on 11 February 2004, is the largest and most horrific of the mass murders that took place during Aristide's presidency : several dozens dead and/or missing, +/- 60 homes destroyed, cases of rape, several vehicles destroyed and several injured ; these numbers are partial as to date, not all of the victims have been identified.

In addition to providing material and financial assistance, NCHR has made the decision to provide legal assistance to the victims and/or their families of the massacre. NCHR felt that such action is crucial for several reasons.

By providing legal assistance for the victims of La Scierie, NCHR will be promoting judicial reform through the preparation and execution of a model trial - the way things are supposed to work in a functional judicial system.

NCHR is not part of the civil class action being brought against the perpetrators of the massacre, thus maintaining its neutrality in the case. As such, NCHR will work to promote and defend the rights of those who have been arrested and who will subsequently be arrested for their implication in the massacre. To date, five (5) individuals have been arrested and placed behind bars - Dauphin ROLAND (alias Black Ronald), Harmony RONALD and Mathieu RAPHAËL (all members of the popular Lavalas organization, Bale Wouze) ; Amaus Mayette (former Lavalas Deputy in St. Marc), and Jocelerme Privet (former Minister of the Interior). NCHR delegations have made initial visits to all of these men in their respective places of detention immediately following their arrests and continue to make periodic visits.

Avoiding the Same Mistakes

To be sure, impunity comes in many forms. The current Haiti leadership must be careful not to commit the same injustices of the past regime by turning a blind eye to the actions of certain individuals with societal influence and position. This means placing behind bars the likes of Castra Cenafils (Raboteau Massacre), Jean Tatoune (Raboteau Massacre), Jodel Chamblain (FRAPH) and others who have been tried and sentenced for their criminal behaviour during the coup d'état years of 1991 - 1994. Furthermore, those identified as having played a role participating in the violence of the coup d'état years (according to the so-called FRAPH documents) must also be held accountable for their role in the slaughter, torture and persecution of Haitian citizens during those years.

Similarly, actions and behaviour of members of the resistance movement must also be examined, investigated, and dealt with appropriately. Prior to the La Scierie massacre, several Lavalas supporters in the town of St. Marc were victimized by violent Opposition supporters as buildings were damaged and property destroyed (such as the building of Radio Pyramid, which was set ablaze). It is imperative that the perpetrators of these acts are taken before the courts to respond for their actions and that they are dealt with accordingly. Negligence on the part of the State to do so is also to encourage impunity.

Likewise, the releasing of more than 3,500 prisoners from Haiti's nineteen (19) prisons on and during the weeks prior to 29 February 2004, does not constitute a legal decision exonerating these individuals of the charges against them. Thus, individuals who have been tried and convicted and/or were awaiting trial, must be returned to their respective prisons so that the Haitian judiciary can treat their cases and that those who should be released will be released in a legal fashion.

Despite the call from numerous organizations and institutions, the current government has yet to demonstrate the political will to do just this, and as such, risks falling into the same abyss of impunity against which we are fighting.

Renewed Hope

It is true that we live in a world of conflict and crisis, where much death and despair abound. But it is also true that we live in a world filled with seeds of hope. And I believe that these seeds exist in Haiti. As we strive towards creating a culture based on the supremacy of human rights and the belief in the sacredness of humanity, NCHR will continue to do its part by being a voice for the voiceless, a source of hope for those who have lost hope and in doing so, pave the way for the establishment of the Rule of Law in Haiti.

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Nation Building in Haiti: Can We Do Better This Time?

Haiti Democracy Project web page item #2165 (http://www.haitipolicy.org)

by April 12, 2004

"I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war... I wouldn't have sent troops to Haiti. I didn't think it was a mission worthwhile. It was a nation-building mission, and it was not very successful. It cost us a couple billions of dollars, and I'm not so sure democracy's any better off in Haiti than it was before."
- Gov. George W. Bush, responding to a question in a presidential debate, October 2000

Less than four years ago, presidential candidate George W. Bush weighed in against President Clinton's 1994 decision to commit troops to Haiti. Last week, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited the 2,000 U.S. Marines that President Bush returned to the country in February on what can only be termed a nation-building exercise.

Both ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the U.S. government must share responsibility for the failures in Haiti since 1994. While Aristide allowed violent gangs to do his bidding and corruption to control his government, the United States failed to make the necessary long-term investments in building democratic institutions and meeting economic needs.

With the promise of elections in 2005, the transitional Haitian government and the United States have an opportunity to lay the groundwork for true democracy and economic development. However, to make this latest intervention a success, the United States must avoid the mistakes of the past by:

1) Rapidly expanding the international troop presence around the country;
2) Making good on promises to disarm both supporters and enemies of the former government;
3) Demonstrating a commitment to democracy rather than to a particular party or candidate; and
4) Rethinking the U.S. commitment and approach to nation-building.

Setting aside the controversy around Aristide's resignation, it is imperative that the United States now send positive signals to Haiti's government and people about its commitment to democratic and economic progress in the hemisphere's poorest country.

Aristide's Mistakes

Aristide started out as one of the most popular Haitian politicians of recent time, revered by Haiti's poor for his courage in opposing the brutal dictatorships of the 1980s and his eloquent, inspiring rhetoric of equality for the downtrodden masses.  As a result, he twice won the presidency (in 1990 and 2000) with overwhelming majorities in free elections. However, Aristide's high-profile waste of state resources, refusal to compromise on issues such as the 2000 parliamentary election dispute, tolerance of corruption at the highest levels, and policy of impunity for his own political supporters quickly eroded his support – first among the middle class, and then among the his core constituency of the poor.

Following longstanding Haitian tradition, Aristide opted to use informal networks of supporters to perform important State functions such as customs collection and security, thus giving rise to the notorious "chimeres" - young, unemployed urban males who lived off the crumbs of government patronage and frequently attacked political opponents. Aristide's refusal to build apolitical State institutions eventually came back to haunt him.

In February 2004, faced with a tiny but relatively disciplined armed rebellion, Aristide's underpaid and unmotivated police force shed their uniforms and fled at the slightest hint of trouble, allowing the rebels to take town after town with little or no resistance. Thus, the defense of the administration was left in the hands of the disorganized chimeres - who were no match for the few dozen members of the dismantled Haitian army and its death squads who took the second largest city of Cap Haitian in broad daylight within hours.

With the rebels in control of northern Haiti and advancing on the capital, Aristide found himself presiding over nothing but chaos. He hastily agreed to a Caribbean Community (CARICOM) power-sharing plan that aimed to keep him in office for the remaining two years of his five-year term – albeit as little more than a figurehead – and appealed for international peacekeepers to shore up his regime. Following the political opposition's refusal of the CARICOM proposal and Port-au-Prince's descent into a violent free-for-all, the Bush administration abandoned Aristide, pointedly telling him that it could not ensure his security. Aristide then wrote a hasty resignation letter and was whisked into exile, making his swift and spectacular demise official.

U.S. Mistakes

Inadequate Crisis Response

Unfortunately, the response of the United States to Aristide's myriad mistakes only compounded Haiti's problems. First, after the U.S. intervention in 1994 to reverse the military coup of 1991 and reinstall Aristide, the interests of policy makers and the public quickly shifted to places like Bosnia and Kosovo, and ultimately to al-Qaida and Iraq. Thus, the United States left Haiti without the resources and supervision necessary for the long-term task of constructing more inclusive political and economic systems.

Second, the United States poorly handled the controversy over the 2000 parliamentary elections. In an election where over 3,000 seats were contested, Organization of American States (OAS) observers deemed the process a success, with the sole exception of the bizarre counting method used to determine eight senate seats.  Those seats gave candidates of Aristide's party, Fanmi Lavalas, a first round victory and avoided a runoff.  The U.S. response to this issue was to block hundreds of millions of dollars in pre-approved loans earmarked for projects such as desperately needed roads and potable water.

When the senators vacated the seats in question, the United States moved the goalposts and insisted on a settlement with Haiti's political opposition.  This move effectively granted veto power to a diverse group of parties that have historically lacked credibility and popular support but have excelled at obstruction. This policy continued through the recent crisis when the United States failed to put adequate pressure on the opposition to accept a negotiated solution. In fact, by rejecting the CARICOM proposal while the rebels were advancing on the capital, the opposition got exactly what it had always clamored for but could never achieve on its own – the early departure of the elected president.

Third, the United States should have intervened more effectively in the February 2004 uprising. The Bush administration, which had deferred to CARICOM and the OAS during much of the crisis, inserted itself into the negotiation process at the last minute and with little consultation, alienating many of its Caribbean neighbors. P.J Patterson, Prime Minister of Jamaica and acting CARICOM head, said that the circumstances surrounding Aristide's departure set a dangerous precedent for regional democracy and were murky enough to warrant a U.N. investigation. Consequently, CARICOM excluded Gerard Latortue, the new Haitian Prime Minister, from its March summit, and Patterson chose to welcome the exiled Aristide to Jamaica despite strong U.S. protests. The United States could have avoided a souring of U.S.-Caribbean relations and painted itself as a more neutral player had it thrown more of its weight, both publicly and privately, behind the collaborative hemispheric approach.

Too Little, Too Late

Most disturbing is how the United States handled the rebels and the security situation in Haiti following Aristide's departure. The United States was the first to know that Aristide had left the country, but the last to fill the power vacuum. This slow-footedness resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars of pillaging and looting in the capital. It also allowed the rebels to march unimpeded to Port-au-Prince, where rebel leader Guy Philippe declared, "I am the military chief. The country is in my hands." Philippe then embarked on a national "listening tour," during which his entourage killed at least two people they mistook for Aristide supporters.

The United States also failed to ensure a sufficient number of international troops on the ground. At the outset, only 1,600 troops replaced Haiti's notoriously understaffed police force of 5,000. Almost a month passed before there were enough troops to deploy outside the capital, leaving most of the country without a security presence in the interim.  The current number of 3,700 troops remains far from adequate, yet there are no plans to finance or provide additional forces. Some Haitians are taking advantage of the resulting lawlessness to pursue personal agendas, from exacting political revenge to settling scores. Members of Lavalas are in hiding. Mob executions of suspected thieves have become commonplace. Former officers of the defunct army are returning to the country, assuming police powers in several towns and advocating the return of the historically repressive force.

Furthermore, the U.S. military has flip-flopped on whether disarmament is a part of its mandate, resulting in little action. The fact that the United States roundly criticized Aristide's recalcitrance to control his own violent supporters makes the administration's mixed signals on neutralizing the rebels and arresting known criminals only that much more shameful.

Next Steps

More Troops and Thorough Disarmament

The immediate objective of U.S. intervention must be to establish enough security to allow Haitians to participate in economic, social and political activities without fear. Thus, the United States should immediately increase the number of troops to ensure a nationwide presence. In addition, the U.S. military should conduct joint patrols with the Haitian police to counter the image of the Americans as occupiers and provide the local police with valuable training from more experienced forces.

Equally important to establishing a climate of security is capturing the criminals who continue to come out of the woodwork. Amnesty International and other human rights organizations have published lists of the human rights violators and convicted criminals roaming free as a result of the rebel campaign. The United States should offer intelligence and manpower to arrest criminals and human rights abusers from both ends of the political spectrum in return for the Haitian government's disowning of the rebels.  This step would signal that the United States and the Latortue government are not taking sides in the long-running political dispute, but rather are seeking to rule in an even-handed way for the first time in Haiti's history.

Promoting Elections, Not Candidates

In the medium-term, the United States has an interest in seeing that free elections are held as soon as reasonably possible. The mandate of several thousand local officials ends in July, and parliamentary elections scheduled for late 2003 have been postponed indefinitely, leaving Haiti without the legislative body needed to approve government loans and international agreements. The "Wise Council" serving as the executive branch watchdog should be replaced with elected representatives as soon as possible to allow popular participation in public affairs, the true basis of any democracy.

The OAS and UN have experience in Haiti and are well placed to divide up the technical tasks associated with holding elections. For the first time in 50 years, there is no dominant force on the Haitian political scene, and the United States has an opportunity to be perceived as favoring the democratic process rather than a particular party or candidate. U.S. contributions to the electoral process in Haiti could include funding for UN and OAS activities, and working with local police to ensure security throughout the electoral period. Security is essential because new leaders will emerge only if they feel safe from threats and violence. By helping in these ways, the United States can assist in offering voters true choices free from intimidation.

Rethinking Nation-Building

Nation-building requires a long-term investment. Too often U.S. attention is diverted by the crisis of the day, and yesterday's favored child quickly becomes today's orphan. Changing the deeply rooted, dysfunctional economic and social systems of countries like Haiti requires extensive time and well-spent, adequate funding, which an impatient American public must support.

With multinational reconstruction efforts now underway not only in Haiti but in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Iraq, nation-building has become a mainstay of post-cold war geopolitics. While stressing that the military should be used only to fight wars, candidate Bush dismissed the idea of a "nation-building corps."  His approach leaves us ill-prepared to perform the important work following military operations in places like Haiti. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, seemed to agree when he said, "It is wrong to think of Haiti as primarily a military problem. This is work that could be done by well-trained police forces." In fact, much of the non-combat work that the U.S. military has undertaken in Haiti could be completed by other entities that are trained specifically for these tasks.

Sharing the responsibilities and risks with international partners reduces the burdens and tensions that often result from unilateral U.S. intervention. One possible solution to the challenge of nation-building is a permanent U.N. force with units for policing, infrastructure-building, tax collection, education and other essential state functions. This force could serve an active, supervisory or advisory role depending on the strength of the local bureaucracy. In all cases, the emphasis of any such force must be on empowering the local population to assume these functions as soon as possible.

Lastly, Aristide enjoys the singular distinction of having been repatriated by the United States as a democratic hero and expatriated less than 10 years later as a failed president. As more and more countries experiment with democracy, the international community must reflect on how best to offer elected leaders incentives to respond to the needs of their citizens. Failure to adequately address this issue will likely result in repeated interventions in other developing democracies, interventions which result from the failures of wealthy nations as much as the failures of poorer ones.

Edward Keane has worked and traveled extensively in Haiti, and has written on Haitian politics, culture and the environment.Center for American Progres

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Why Haiti Should Get Out of CARICOM

by Roger Milcéus

The diplomatic row between Haiti and Caricom has reminded us Haitians that there is an obscure entity called "Caricom" to which we belong. Since the Preval administration and the subsequent Aristide administration kept the country in the dark about our adhesion, it is perhaps a good idea to review what Caricom is, and why we should pull out of  that organization.

What is Caricom?

The Caribbean Community - Caricom for short - regroups 15 member states: 13 English-speaking countries (Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint-Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago), Suriname (Dutch), and Haiti. If many of these island nations sound unfamiliar to you, do not fret. Very few people care about them as they are quite insignificant, although the people in these places are no doubt wonderful human beings. Caricom also boasts 5 associate member states: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Island.

Our country was the last one to join the community: it was granted provisional membership in 1998 and became a full member in 2002. Caricom's total population is about 14 million, 60% of which are Haitian. As you can imagine, without the inclusion of our country, that monstrous-sounding regional bloc would have had a grand total of 6 million people, not enough to give it any type of significance on the world stage.

Caricom's political structure is somewhat similar to that of other regional blocs. It consists of:

Caricom has developed several programs to create a community that makes perfect sense for the English-speaking countries (almost all former colonies of England which gained their independence starting in the 1960's or are still under British rule in one form or another.) It is also in the process of setting up a Caribbean Court of Justice, which will become quite problematic for us Haitians as our legal code is quite different from the one practiced in the other member states.

Finally, Caricom has spawned a Common Market which requires further study, as it could be quite detrimental to the economic development of Haiti

What's Wrong With Our Membership in Caricom ?

Just about everything pertaining to Haiti's membership in Caricom is wrong, starting with the fact that Haiti has been slighted by Caricom at every turn ... but I digress already. Here is, in no particular order, my list of complaints:

1. How We Joined Caricom

There was very little preparation work and consultation done by the Preval administration for Haiti to join Caricom. The notice of our provisional membership came as a surprise to the vast majority of the Haitian private sector, for example, which was not consulted on the matter. Needless to say, the average Haitian to this day has no clue about this nebulous entity that is mentioned only in passing on the radio. While other Caricom countries take seriously the different programs of the community, it is increasingly evident that the Preval/Aristide duo only wanted to join Caricom for the "political support" they might obtain and never really thought about the responsibilities Haiti would have to bear for such membership.

In that respect, although Caricom had outlined for a long time the list of reforms that all countries had to undertake in order to comply with the objectives of the community, it is fair to say that nothing has been done by either Mr. Preval or Aristide, to move Haiti on the path of integration:

No serious prep work of any type was initiated for our joining the Caricom Single Market and Economy (CSME for short). When we study the progress of other members states (as slow and disappointing as they are, by Caricom's own admission), it is frightening to see that the Preval/Aristide administrations never even set a committee to start addressing these reforms

There has been no effort on the Haitian side to examine the implications of the establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ.) Except for Haiti and maybe Suriname, all Caricom member states practice and are intimately familiar with English Common Law, a legal code handed down to them by the British. In the case of Haiti, we are using a completely different system inherited from the French. If Haiti is to accept and use the CCJ, what adjustments will we have to make? Will the CCJ accept French and/or Creole as official languages? If not, what will that mean for Haitian lawyers and judges who do not speak English? It is worth remembering that the most spoken language in Caricom is not English, but Haitian Creole as Haiti by itself represents 60% of the Caricom population and Creole is spoken by 100% of Haitians. It is also worth noting that nowhere in Caricom literature is this fact mentioned. 

2. The Common Market

	Haiti has the lowest tariffs of any country in the region. Caricom right off the bat will then be confronted with a tariff harmonization quandary with regards to Haiti: will we set the standard, thereby forcing some of these countries to bring certain tariffs to zero as we have done, or will we have to raise our tariffs again to match our neighbors, and run afoul of IMF dictates in the process?
	The free movement of University Graduates within the community doesn't seem to have been extended to Haiti yet. Caricom cannot claim to set a single set of rules and yet discriminate against Haiti on what is undoubtedly one of the most important aspects of any regional community: free movement of people and labor. The Bahamas has decided not to join the CSME in part because it fears an unchecked immigration of Haitians. Never mind the fact that the illegal immigration of Haitians to the Bahamas has been by non-University graduates, yet the Bahamas today would not survive if the Haitians left. Who would undertake all the menial jobs and the back-breaking labor that the Bahamians just will not do? Ditto for the Turks and Caicos islands where Haitian labor practically built all the tourism facilities and the roads.
	Free movement of capital is a wonderful sounding concept. In practice, given the economic disparities and the many illicit activities (mainly drug trafficking) that are occurring throughout the region, it is more than likely that specific jurisdictions will become the overwhelming favorites with regards to deposits and that a number of entrpreneurs and corporate executives will play a shell game with the tax man, taking advantage of looser capital flow regulations. Unless the financial services industry transforms itself in the region and alliances or mergers quickly occur, some countries' financial institutions will shrivel while others will thrive. There is nothing I see in the plan put forward by Caricom in that regard that will allow for an orderly transition.
	If Haiti takes more time than the other countries in structuring its legal and fiscal codes, and if the country cannot offer the same infrastructure amenities that other member states have, then it is likely that foreign direct investment will not come from Caricom companies looking to do business in Haiti. Instead, they will produce elsewhere and export their products to Haiti, much like the Dominican Republic is now doing. Haiti is already suffering from the dumping of products by American and Dominican companies, and that will be simply extended to other Caribbean countries. We therefore will not see the level of job creation that will allow us to increase the standard of living of our citizens. So what economic benefit will we derive from our membership in Caricom? Zero. Zilch. Zip. Nada. Anyen. Keep in mind, also, that Caricom represents less than 4% of our overall trade.

Has Caricom really defined the common interests of the region (including Haiti) when faced with such sweeping agreements as the Free Trade of the Americas Agreement (FTAA) for example? And how did Haiti contribute in the elaboration of the Caricom agenda? Since our own officials did not report back to the Haitian people on the issue, it is hard to imagine that we actually worked through the issues and that we discussed them with the other Caricom member states. In fact, I cannot think of a single occasion when the Preval or Aristide administration actually organized broad public forums to educate the Haitian people on that process.

Do we believe that we can have converging interests with the rest of Caricom? Our economic structure, our trading patterns, our sheer population  size compared to the rest of them puts Haiti in a different position. It is hard to imagine that the Caricom bloc can effectively help us in defending our interests.

On a lighter note, I could not help but laugh as the issue of the Cricket World Cup 2007 was on the original agenda of the Basse Terre summit. Assuming for a moment that the Haitian Government had been allowed to participate, what could the Haitian representative have added to the discussion of cricket? That sport is the national pastime in many of the member states and a point of pride, especially in international competition for the likes of Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad et al which field a common team. But we in Haiti don't know a thing about this most British of sports (even more so than football.) And cricket is a but a tiny example of the culture gap between ourselves and the rest of Caricom that can never be bridged.

	Caricom countries based their hard-line attitude against the Latortue government on (1) their opinion that Aristide was illegally removed from office and (2) their objection to Latortue's embrace of the rebels during his visit to Gonaives.
	We can understand the former point, that the ambiguity of Aristide's departure is unsettling to some Caribbean government members. To us Haitians, however, it is not ambiguous at all. Aristide has been claiming that he was "kidnapped" and that his security forces (the Steele Foundation) were pulled from him. Yet, a few facts quickly show that Aristide is trying to pull the wool over the eyes of his unsuspecting supporters: (1) Aristide and his wife had sent their two daughters away to the United States using ONE-WAY tickets days before their departure, so did members of Aristide's entourage like his communications czar Mario Dupuy - this can easily be verified through American Airlines. If they had no intention of leaving, why bother sending the kids away? Clearly, they knew that their days in power were numbered and they had started taking the necessary steps to get out of the country; (2) the Aristides had packed their bags in the afternoon preceding their departure and had cleaned their apartment at the National Palace of everything they possessed. If they had no plans to leave, why did they take everything from the Palace to their private residence and pack them?; (3) the Steele Foundation had 5 of its security personnel accompany Aristide all the way to Bangui, directly contradicting the claims made by Aristide that he had no personal security except for Frantz Gabriel. Indeed, we have always known that Aristide was quite a liar. That the Caricom leadership decided not to investigate his claims, and accepted them at face value, shows that they are either naive or have been very well paid to defend his interest. We cannot see any other explanation. Dawn Rich of the Jamaica Gleaner had it exactly right about Prime Minister Patterson's ill-advised move and his blind trust of Aristide.
	The latter point however, concerning Latortue's embrace of the rebels, shows the Caricom leadership for the two-faced, sleazy political operators that they really are. Spewing forth all the appropriate rhetoric about democratic principles and respect for human rights, the Caricom leaders were quick to condemn Latortue - AND RIGHTLY SO! - for his statements and stance in Gonaives regarding the "freedom fighters." But we must then ask ourselves:
	Where were these same Caricom leaders when Aristide was entertaining notorious GANG LEADERS at the National Palace on February 27, 2002 and appearing with them in public and on television (Télévision Nationale) ? These gang leaders had just engaged in a brutal turf war that had led to the burning and destruction of tens of houses and the death of scores of people in the notorious Cite Soleil slum of Port-au-Prince. And they got to be hosted by the President as a reward.
	From haiticulture.com:

Have the Caricom leaders read the report published on February 4, 2003, by Merrill Smith, coordinator of the US Committee on Refugees, entitled "DEMOCRACY UNRAVELING - Political Violence in Haiti 2002"? Can they really claim that Aristide was a democrat? THIS IS PROBABLY THE MOST ENLIGTENING REPORT ON OUR FALL INTO TOTALITARIANISM AND IS A MUST-READ FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO DON'T KNOW WHAT THE ARISTIDE ADMINISTRATION REALLY DID. This report can be found in Adobe Acrobat (PDF) format at the following address:

Where were these leaders when Aristide ordered and supervised the politicization of the Haitian National Police? Are they aware that Aristide personally endorsed the application of the "zero tolerance" policy which allowed the police to kill suspects without so much as a shred of due process? Read the following communique from the National Coalition on Haitian Rights, a well-respected Haitian human rights organization: http://www.nchr.org/hrp/safety_communique.htm

Did these leaders press Aristide to investigate the murders of journalists, in particular Jean Dominique and Brignol Lindor? The following links provide more information:

Where were these leaders when the police and pro-Aristide armed gangs went on a witch hunt against our youth and our valiant university students, culminating in the horrible events of December 5, 2003 when the Dean of the State University of Haiti had his two legs broken by Aristide thugs in the presence of the police? Mr. Pierre-Marie Paquiot is now confined to a wheelchair.

What did Caricom have to say when the Haitian government encouraged the now-infamous Ponzi scheme (the so-called cooperatives scandal) that robbed Haitians out of 600 million gourdes (about US$30 million at the time) and wiped out the savings of the working poor and the lower middle class, the two tranches of our society that had the most to lose and the least protection in our society? How could they stay silent when this scheme, actively promoted by the government in 2001 in a bid to undermine the influence of the formal banking sector, collapsed dramatically by the end of 2002 with no effort by the financial authorities, the National Cooperative Council, or the Executive to prevent the collapse? Where were the Caricom leaders when government offficials accepted huge bribes from the cooperatives promoters to grant them safe passage to other countries so that they would not be prosecuted and could abscond with the millions they stole? And is it true that Aristide asked some of the same cooperative promoters to pay the salaries of the police and high ranking officials in exchange for immunity from prosecution? Why couldn't the Aristide government promote a policy of inclusion of the less fortunate in the established banking sector instead, which is one of the better regulated and supervised industries in Haiti? And why did Aristide promise to reimburse defrauded investors - which sent the wrong signal by having the government bailout the promoters - and then RENEGED on the promise? If this is not an economic crime, then what is?

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Public Document
****************************************
For more information please call Amnesty International's press office in London, UK, on +44 20 7413 5566
Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WC1X 0DW. web: http://www.amnesty.org.

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Haiti rich and poor are at war

31 mars 2004
MIKE WILLIAMS

PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti -- The orange peel was removed with the utmost care, in one long, thin strip, and not one speck of savory fruit was wasted. Even the peel will be used : It hangs from a rusty nail under the tin roof of the one-room shack where Fanfan Cherie lives, and it says everything about his life and the life of Haiti’s impoverished masses.

"We must save that to start our charcoal fire for cooking," said Cherie, a muscular but far too thin man of 33. He is a plumber and welder who has not worked steadily in years, despite his best efforts to find a job. "But today there is no food anyway, so there is no fire in the kitchen. It will be another day of hunger."

Five miles away, on the outskirts of a slum called Cité Soleil, Marie Louise Baker chokes back tears as she surveys the gutted ruins of her family’s textile assembly factory, which was destroyed by marauders Feb. 28, the day before President Jean-Bertrand Aristide fled into exile.

"When I look at this, it is a feeling of destruction," she said. "They broke all the machines and then burned everything. My family has lost all that we built in 30 years of work. We invested everything here. None of our money left Haiti. And now our 800 employees have lost their jobs. Each job here supports about 10 people. That’s 8,000 people now with no income."

Cherie and Baker : Their two faces, just like their backgrounds, couldn’t be more distinct. Cherie is dark and handsome, with piercing eyes, while Baker is light-skinned and striking, possessed of a grace and beauty that belie her 59 years.

They are the two faces of Haiti, and their lives speak much about the country’s divided past, as well as its hope for a future of unity and progress, breaking a cycle of 200 years of violence and failed governments.

From its founding in 1804 as the world’s first independent black republic, Haiti has been riven by resentments, suspicion and exploitation, pitting its overwhelming black majority against a tiny elite, probably less than 1 percent of the population, that owns most of the wealth.

When black slaves overthrew their French colonial masters, they went on a rampage that prompted whites to flee. But staying behind was a tiny class of mixed-race people, called mulattos, who moved quickly to take over the plantations.

The black generals who led the rebellion set up Haiti’s government. The mulattos slipped into a role as the country’s class of business and plantation owners. Over the next two centuries, the two coexisted uneasily, at times joining in quiet alliances, at other times resigned to stand-offs edged with resentment.

Haiti’s governments were rarely successful. It became one of those countries that exemplified the term kleptocracy - its governments were run primarily for the purpose of stealing from the public coffers. Haitian dictators were typically brutal, many ousted by violent coups d’état, which have struck the beleaguered country 33 times in 200 years, an average of once every six years.

In the midst of such corruption, the elite, for the most part, did not develop a sense of civic duty. Often forced to pay bribes to conduct business, many took the easy way out, building lives of luxury on the backs of poor workers paid pennies for their labor.

The sad history created a contrast in geography : Port-au-Prince is a sprawling city of 2 million, with the poor living jumbled in ramshackle shantytowns along the hot lowlands while the rich reside in opulent walled compounds on the cooler slopes of the mountain range that rises abruptly from the city’s heart.

Fifteen years ago, there were great hopes that Haiti might finally be shaking off its past. Aristide, a fiery-tongued slum priest, burst onto the scene, winning Haiti’s first free and fair elections on a promise to serve and lift up the poor.

Removed once in a military coup, then restored in 1994 through U.S. intervention, Aristide betrayed his populist promises, his critics say, instead building a corrupt government of cronies who looted the national treasury in the worst Haitian tradition, even as they enforced their will through the use of armed gangs.

Baker does not know who burned her family’s factory, but there seems little doubt the destruction came at the hands of Aristide loyalists. The Bakers were part of the opposition, a nonviolent group that demanded Aristide’s resignation.

A hallmark of Aristide’s oratory was his excoriation of Haiti’s rich, whom he likened to rocks in a stream washed by cool waters. He often called on his followers to help the rich learn about the life of the poor, whom he likened to rocks baking in the hot Caribbean sun.

Cherie, from the same small town in southern Haiti where Aristide was born, was a strong Aristide supporter.

"Haiti’s whole problem is the elites," he said. "When Aristide tried to do anything to help the poor, the elites would block him."

But Baker says her family built its factory near one of Haiti’s most dangerous, hopeless slums because she cares about the poor.

"I will not leave Cité Soleil," she said, vowing to rebuild, even if it takes generations. "We are working the best way we know how to change Haiti, by creating jobs, by paying taxes to the state. We are not here to step on the poor. We’re trying to provide jobs to help them improve their lives."

Some of Baker’s employees have worked for the family for decades. They earned the equivalent of about $4 per day, roughly four times Haiti’s minimum wage.

Cherie has never been touched in his life by any such concern on the part of Haiti’s rich.

"The only work I find is small jobs for the elite," he said. "They offer me a job that I know should cost 5,000 gourdes [about $125], and they say they will only pay me 500 gourdes [about $12]. If I refuse, they will find someone else, because there are too many here who will do anything to feed their families."

"I finished high school," Cherie said. "I wanted to become an engineer or a doctor. But those jobs are only for the elite in Haiti. No poor person like me has money to go to the university for such an education."

Baker’s grandfather was an Episcopal missionary from England, her grandfather a trader and her father an agronomist. She and some of her siblings opened a tiny sewing operation in 1970, making it grow through hard work and steady reinvestment of the profits.

Her brother, Charles, is one of the most outspoken leaders of the Group of 184, a coalition of business, civic and peasant groups that sprang up in the past 18 months in an effort to resolve Haiti’s political crisis.

"Haiti has always been divided between rich and poor," Baker said. "That’s why the Group of 184 was started. We are all one nation, and we spent months going around the country holding meetings, telling the leaders of peasant groups that we are all brothers and sisters. . . . We are finally working toward the same objective and not looking at each other across a divide."

Whether such an appeal will break down the suspicions of the poor is the question that may dictate Haiti’s future.

For now, Cherie seems almost too broken by his poverty to muster much trust or hope.

His 15-year-old daughter, Linda, a pretty girl with colorful plastic beads in her braided hair, is soft-spoken and polite.

"I am studying hard in school," she declares. "I want to be a doctor - or an engineer."

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Don't Reinstate Army

Oscar Arias, former president of Costa Rica & 1987 Nobel Peace laureate., 2004-04-02

Haiti Democracy Project web page item #2091 (http://www.haitipolicy.org)

The Haitian army was abolished nine years ago during a period of democratic transition precisely to prevent the country from falling back into the hands of military men. Now that the U.S. Marines have made the commendable decision to disarm rebel and pro-Aristide militants alike, the Haitian people desperately need the international community to ensure that it finishes the job.

Like so many Third World countries, Haiti has suffered not only from a lack of national security in the sense of borders and territorial integrity but also an ongoing crisis of human security, the right of each person to live in peace and with the guarantee of basic rights such as food, healthcare, education and citizenship. The army, long an instrument of suppressive authoritarian regimes, has historically deprived Haitians of these fundamental rights.

Predatory role

Isolated and destitute, Haitians have been terrorized not only by military violence but also by its accompanying legacy of poverty. In the late 1980s, the army consumed approximately 40 percent of the national budget even as hunger and AIDS decimated the population. Haiti could count on one soldier for every 1,000 citizens, and 1.5 doctors for every 10,000.

The 1991 coup against Haiti's first democratically elected president was definitive proof of the army's predatory role. Even though the 1994 agreement returning Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office called for a reduction of the army from 7,500 to 1,500 troops, a force that size was still a clear threat to democratic governance. In 1995, I visited Haiti to discuss with Aristide the benefits of doing away with the army entirely. He readily agreed that the army was a problem but doubted that he would have the political mandate to tackle it.

Since Aristide said that he could not abolish the army without the support of the Haitian people, the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress commissioned an independent polling firm to gauge popular support for the idea. The results were stunning: 62 percent of Haitians were strongly in favor of abolition, and only 12 percent were against.

These figures were key in convincing Aristide that demilitarization was an idea whose time had come. He cut the army's funding and set in motion a legislative process to have the abolition of the army enshrined in Haiti's constitution. In 1996, when I visited Haiti for the inauguration of presidential successor René Préval, Aristide happily noted that of the 7,500-man army, the only ones still on the government payroll were 20 marching-band musicians.

Duties of civil defense

After the troops were disbanded, the next steps to consolidate the rule of law were clear: The population needed to be disarmed; death-squad leaders and army generals had to be brought to justice; and the police force required restructuring and professional training to take on the duties of civil defense. The abolition of the army was thus designed to complement larger nation-building initiatives developed in conjunction with the United Nations, the Organization of American States and the U.S. government.

But after a brief period of support after the U.S. occupation in 1994, the international community essentially left Haiti to work out its problems alone. The aid squeeze following the contested 2000 elections caused an implosion of the Haitian economy and a consequent crisis of governance.

Armed opposition groups of former soldiers reconstituted themselves both in Haiti and in the neighboring Dominican Republic. Aristide's response to his predicament was disappointing, if not predictable. With his power threatened, he encouraged the formation of pro-government gangs. The chiméres also attacked students and peaceful demonstrators, a chilling echo of the army's former role.

But it would be wrong to interpret Haiti's current crisis as proof that the original decision to demilitarize was a mistake. The abolition of the army makes as much sense today as it did in 1995.

Repressive institution

It was never expected that the abolition of the army would immediately bring peace and development to Haiti. In the absence of economic development and political stability, no single reform is capable of rescuing a failing state. Nonetheless, the greatest achievement of Haiti's first democratic government was the removal of that repressive and unjust institution.

Were the international community now to stand by as the rebels reinstated the army, it would surely destroy the seeds of peace and self-rule that have been planted with great sacrifice by the Haitian people.

Oscar Arias, a former president of Costa Rica, is the 1987 Nobel Peace laureate.

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US looking at Aristide's possible role jn drug trade

3 avril 2004

U.S. prosecutors in Miami are investigating whether former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide pocketed millions of dollars from drug traffickers who moved tons of cocaine through the poor nation, federal sources familiar with the inquiry said Friday.

’’It’s in the early stages,’’ one law enforcement source told The Herald. ``It’s a bit premature to say we’ve got anything yet. But you’re not wrong if you say that’s where we’re going.’’

Several officials in South Florida and Washington also said investigators have been briefed on reports that relatives of Aristide and his wife, Mildred, hold nearly $250 million in European banks. The officials added, however, that there is no indication yet whether the funds actually exist.

Haitian Justice Minister Bernard Gousse meanwhile said Friday he will establish a commission next week to investigate allegations against Aristide -- everything from misuse of government funds to human-rights abuses.

’’It will look at what he was up to during his presidency, and the scope will be very broad,’’ Gousse told The Herald.

Ira Kurzban, Aristide’s Miami lawyer, attributed the probe to politics : ``After kidnapping President Aristide, the Bush administration is not content to simply end democracy in Haiti -- they need to politically assassinate Aristide.’’

Spokesmen for the U.S. attorney’s office and the Drug Enforcement Administration in Miami, and the Justice Department in Washington, declined to comment on the investigation, first reported by The Wall Street Journal.

Several of the South Florida sources said U.S. officials in Washington, who had refused to support a criminal case against Aristide when he was still president, changed their tune in recent weeks.

The political will shifted, they said, after Aristide started alleging that U.S. officials forced him to resign and go into exile. Washington has denied the accusations.

U.S. officials have long complained that Aristide was at least turning a blind eye to drug traffickers who used Haiti to transship Colombian cocaine to U.S. streets.

Ironically, his increased cooperation with DEA and U.S. Embassy personnel in the waning months of his tenure greatly accelerated the case now being built against him.

The Herald has learned that the Aristide government expelled to the United States four prominent drug trafficking suspects between June and October -- three of whom have pleaded guilty and are now cooperating with the DEA in the investigation against the former president.

Traffickers such as Beaudoin ’’Jacques’’ Ketant, under a 1997 indictment in Miami accusing him of moving 15 tons of cocaine through Haiti, had avoided deportation earlier because Haitian law enforcement and the judiciary were easily corrupted.

WENT TOO FAR

But last May, Ketant’s thugs allegedly roughed up an administrator at the Union School in Port-au-Prince. Livid U.S. Embassy officials, whose children attended the school along with one of Ketant’s children, demanded that Aristide give him up.

Believing he was being summoned to a meeting at the presidential palace, Ketant was taken by Haitian police on June 18 to waiting DEA agents who flew him to South Florida.

He has since told U.S. officials that he paid Aristide and the head of his palace security, Oriel Jean, up to $500,000 a month to let him land small planes loaded with cocaine on National Route 9, according to sources familiar with the case. Ketant also claims to have made massive payoffs to Aristide’s political party and to one of his social-work foundations.

Over the three months after Ketant’s expulsion to the United States, DEA operatives and embassy personnel in Haiti pushed Aristide to expel three other trafficking suspects : Eliobert Jasme, Carlos Ovalle and Eddy Aurelien.

Ovalle, a Colombian who lived in Haiti for more than a decade and acted as the transshipment coordinator, was expelled in September.

Aurelien, a former Miami resident and music promoter charged with distributing crack cocaine, turned up in Haiti shortly after he skipped bond in 1997. Aurelien was returned in handcuffs in August.

Ovalle and Aurelien immediately pleaded guilty and started giving extensive briefings to federal prosecutors and DEA and Florida Department of Law Enforcement agents. Jasme, who was brought to the United States in September, is not cooperating.

The investigation into Aristide’s possible links to traffickers accelerated last month when Oriel Jean was detained in Canada on a U.S. drug-trafficking charge. Jean had been booted as chief of security in June, within days of Ketant’s expulsion.

RESISTANT DEFENDANT

U.S. prosecutors and agents are leaning on Jean to cooperate, the law enforcement sources said. But Jean’s Miami attorney, David Raben, said Friday his client intends to fight the charges vigorously.

The sources acknowledged that they may have trouble using several of the traffickers -- plus an unnamed Haitian policeman who informed on Jean -- as witnesses against Aristide because they may also have been working for the CIA.

’Some of these guys will have been working for the guys whose initials we shall not speak,’’ one of the sources said. ``But it’s so early in this, we will have to see.’’

 LARRY LEBOWITZ

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